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Abstract
The traditional analysis of the basic version of the double-slit experiment leads to the conclusion
that wave-particle duality is a fundamental fact of nature. However, such a conclusion means
to imply that we are not only required to have two contradictory pictures of reality but also
compelled to abandon the objectiveness of the truth values, “true” and “false”. Yet, even if we
could accept wave-like behavior of quantum particles as the best explanation for the build-up
of an interference pattern in the double-slit experiment, without the objectivity of the truth
values we would never have certainty regarding any statement about the world. The present
paper discusses ways to reconcile the correct description of the double-slit experiment with the
objectiveness of “true” and “false”.
Keywords: Wave-particle duality; Truth values; Double-slit experiment; Propositions; Math-
ematical statements; Truth value assignment; Closed linear subspaces; Three-valued semantics;
Hilbert lattices; Schrödinger’s cat; Wigner’s friend.
1 Introduction
Wave–particle duality is the concept of quantum mechanics, which holds that every quantum par-
ticle can be described as either a particle or a wave [1]. Despite being proposed and developed long
ago, wave–particle duality remains a conundrum in modern physics.
To make plain its problematic character, let us consider the basic version of the Young’s double-slit
experiment: Emitted one at a time, quantum particles (like photons or electrons) hit a plate pierced
by two slits (labeled 1 and 2), which are located along the x-axis at x = 0 and x = d, respectively,
and are afterwards observed on a screen behind the plate.
Let us examine the following statement: «In the double-slit experiment, the quantum particle
passes through one or the other slit, but not both» (to set statements off from the rest of the text,
in this paper they are inserted in the double angle quotation marks). For brevity, let the above
statement be denoted by the capital letter C.
∗Email : arkadyv@bgu.ac.il
1
On the word of Feynman [2], if one has a piece of apparatus able to determine whether a quantum
particle goes through the slit 1 or the slit 2 (called a which-way detector), then one can say that
the particle goes through either the slit 1 or the slit 2 and so one can say that the statement C is
true. But, when both slits are open and there is no which-way detector, an interference pattern
builds up slowly on the screen as more particles go through the slits. In that case, one may not say
that each quantum particle passes through either the slit 1 or the slit 2, and, correspondingly, one
may not say that the statement C is true. Providing C may be either true or false, this last means
that the statement C is false.
In this way, the concept of wave–particle duality brings in the dual valuation for the statement C.
Namely, in case the quantum particle is described as a classically defined particle, C is true, but if
the quantum particle is described as a classically defined wave, C becomes false.
However, the problem is that the character of the statement C is quite different from that of a
contingent statement which may be true in one instance but false in another. As a matter of fact,
if a which-way detector is present in the experiment, the statement C is a tautology, i.e., C is true
in every instance (here “instance” is understood as a recording of the particle’s position on the
screen). Put differently, C is true regardless of the truths and falsities of the contingent statements
«The quantum particle passes through the slit 1» and «The quantum particle passes through the
slit 2». But as soon as the which-way detector is out (and both slits are open), the statement C
makes a transition from a tautology to a contradiction since in that case there are no instances
wherein C could fail to be false.
A transformation of a tautology into a contradiction (and vice versa) would be possible if “true”
and “false” were to be not objective (absolute) but relative to experience. To be sure, suppose that
“true” and “false” were dependent on the act of observing the quantum particle in the double-slit
experiment. Then, the type of observation would determine which of the properties of the quantum
particle – pertaining to a particle or to a wave – would show up in the experiment and, hence, what
kind of a logical statement would be C – a tautology or a contradiction.
More to the point, let both slits be open and suppose that a which-way detector is brought in the
experiment sometime. Then, one finds that even if the statement C initially is a contradiction, it
may nonetheless turn out to be a tautology at a later time. This would be equivalent to saying
that “false” can be converted into “true” when the observation is made or when “false” is subject
to empirical testing. Clearly, this could happen only if the truth values were subjective.
On the other hand, if “true” and “false” were to be nonabsolute, we would never have certainty
regarding any statement about the world – including statements grounded in meanings, indepen-
dent of matters of fact. Take, for example, the mathematical statement «2+2=5». It is false solely
by definition, that is, we need not consult experience to determine whether «2+2=5» is false or
not. Moreover, even though this statement can be falsified by experience, it is not grounded in
experience. This means that the aforesaid statement is necessarily false and so we can be certain
that it was false in the past and will remain false at any future moment, regardless of the limits
of our present knowledge or our powers of theoretical understanding. However, were “false” to
be subjective, the statement «2+2=5» would be empirically false, that is, the falsity of «2+2=5»
would be contingent on the observation of facts. As a result, we could not rule out an occasion
when this statement was verified by experience.
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Hence, the wave–particle duality appears to lead to the conclusion that the truths and falsities of
logic and mathematics need confirmation by observations.
Since this conclusion is controvertible at best, the puzzle is, then, how to bring together the suc-
cessful description of the double-slit experiment with the objectiveness of “true” and “false”. The
present paper seeks the answer to this puzzle.
2 Truth values of statements about the double-slit experiment
Let us start by recalling that the simplest statement of a mathematical relation (as equality or
inequality) between meaningful expressions (i.e., symbols or combinations of symbols representing
a value, a function, an object or the like) is called an atomic mathematical statement [3, 4]. A state-
ment like this can be classified as analytic since its truth and falsity depend solely on the meaning of
its terms. The simplest synthetic (i.e., not analytic) statement, which affirms or denies something
meaningful about the world and is capable of being true or false, is called an atomic proposition [5].
More complex mathematical statements (or propositions) are called molecular ones. They are built
up out of atomic components via logical connectives, for example, ⊔ (logical disjunction), ⊓ (logical
conjunction) and ¬ (logical negation).
In the paper, an atomic mathematical statement is denoted by a lowercase letter (which may con-
tain sub- and superscript characters), for example, «3 ≤ 4» = a1, while an atomic proposition is
denoted by an uppercase letter (which also may contain sub- and superscript characters), e.g.,
«Today is Sunday»= A, where the combination of « . . .» and = stands for “. . . is denoted by . . . ”.
Correspondingly, the atomic proposition asserting that in the double-slit experiment the quantum
particle passes through the particular slit – 1 or 2 – can be presented in the following way:
n ∈ {1, 2} : «The quantum particle passes through the slit n»= Pn . (1)
Suppose that the state of the quantum particle in the double-slit experiment is described by Ψ(x),
the complex scalar function of x (whose codomain contains more than the value 0). Providing Ψ(x)
is given, one can consider the atomic mathematical statement posed as
n ∈ {1, 2} : «Ψ(x) ∈ {cnφn(x)∣∣cn ∈ C, cn 6= 0}»= sn , (2)
where φ1(x) and φ2(x) are spatially separated complex functions of x localized at x = 0 and x = d,
in that order. The statement sn is true if Ψ(x) is equal to the function φn(x) multiplied by some
(non-zero) complex number cn, otherwise sn is false.
Due to their spatial separation, the functions φ1(x) and φ2(x) can be made orthonormal over the
interval −∞ ≤ x ≤ +∞, to be exact,
3
n, l ∈ {1, 2} : 〈φn|φl〉 =
∫ +∞
−∞
φ∗n(x)φl(x)dx = δnl . (3)
As a result, the statements s1 and s2 cannot be true together, i.e.,
n ∈ {1, 2}, m = n− (−1)n : (sn ⊓ sm)⇔ ⊥ , (4)
where the connective ⇔ corresponds to the expression “is equivalent to” and ⊥ stands for an ar-
bitrary contradiction. In other words, the truth of s1 means the falsity of s2, and the truth of s2
means the falsity of s1.
However, since ¬sn is not equivalent to sm (in symbols, ¬sn < sm), it may be the case that s1 and
s2 are false together. To be exact,
(sn ⊔ sm)< ⊤ , (5)
where ⊤ signifies an arbitrary tautology. Thus, assume that the state of the quantum particle, just
as it emerges from the double-slit plate, is described by a superposition of the functions φ1(x) and
φ2(x), namely,
Ψ(x) = c1φ1(x) + c2φ2(x) . (6)
Then, Ψ(x) is not an element of {c1φ1(x)|c1 ∈C, c1 6= 0}, and neither it is an element of {c2φ2(x)|c2 ∈
C, c2 6= 0}, that is, both s1 and s2 are false.
Understanding that the function Ψ(x) is orthonormal, the following holds
〈Ψ|Ψ〉 =
∫
Ψ∗(x)Ψ(x)dx =
∫ ∣∣Ψ(x)∣∣2dx = 1 , (7)
where, in accordance with (6),
∣∣Ψ(x)∣∣2 = ∣∣c1φ1(x)∣∣2 + ∣∣c2φ2(x)∣∣2 + c∗1c2φ∗1(x)φ2(x) + c∗2c1φ∗2(x)φ1(x) . (8)
The cross terms in the above expression represent interference.
Those terms will drop off if a which-way detector is placed at the double-slit plate. To demonstrate
this, assume that |d1〉 and |d2〉 are two possible quantum states of the which-way detector such
that
〈dn|dl〉 = δnl . (9)
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In the presence of the which-way detector, the quantum states of the paths |φ1〉 and |φ2〉, where
|φn〉 =
∫
φn(x) |x〉dx , (10)
get entangled with the states of the detector |d1〉 and |d2〉, respectively, so that the total quantum
state of the experiment |Ψexp〉 is
|Ψexp〉 =
∫
Ψexp(x) |x〉dx , (11)
where
Ψexp(x) = c1φ1(x) |d1〉+ c2φ2(x) |d2〉 . (12)
As it follows, the cross terms are missing in |Ψexp(x)|2:
∣∣Ψexp(x)∣∣2 = ∣∣c1φ1(x)∣∣2 + ∣∣c2φ2(x)∣∣2 +✭✭✭✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭
c∗1c2φ
∗
1(x)φ2(x)〈d1|d2〉+✭✭✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭
✭
c∗2c1φ
∗
2(x)φ1(x)〈d2|d1〉 . (13)
Moreover, caused by the macroscopic nature of the which-way detector, the state |Ψexp〉 will evolve
over some period of time t into one of the entangled states, meaning that the quantum particle will
be reported by the macroscopic detector at exactly one slit. In symbols,
c1φ1(x) |d1〉+ c2φ2(x) |d2〉 t−→ either c1φ1(x) |d1〉 or c2φ2(x) |d2〉 . (14)
Therefore, at a time later than t, the atomic mathematical statements presented as follows
n ∈ {1, 2} : «Ψexp(x) ∈
{
cnφn(x) |dn〉
∣∣cn ∈ C, cn 6= 0}»= s ′n (15)
will be neither true together nor false together, that is, (s ′1 ⊓ s ′2)⇔ ⊥ and (s ′1 ⊔ s ′2)⇔ ⊤.
Assume that the notions of truth and falsity of a statement cannot be regarded as primitive; rather,
a proof must be provided in order to accept that the statement is true or false. For a mathematical
statement, such a proof can be either constructive or non-constructive. A non-constructive proof
confirms the validity of a mathematical relation between expressions constituting a statement with-
out providing an instance of those expressions. Whereas a constructive proof demonstrates that
the mathematical relation is valid by creating an instance of the expressions. Take the mathe-
matical statement such as «ab ∈ Q» where the symbols a and b denote certain irrational numbers:
a, b ∈ R\Q. To confirm the validity of the relation ∈ between ab and the set of rational numbers, Q,
the non-constructive proof does not provide an instance of a and b but shows that the said relation
is possible; whilst on the contrary, the constructive proof gives such an example: (
√
2)log
√
2
3 = 3.
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As to a proposition, its proof can be provided by the truth of the relating mathematical statements.
Specifically, the truth of the mathematical statement sn (or s
′
n) can be taken as positive evidence
witnessing the truth of the proposition Pn. By the same token, the truth of sm (or s
′
m) can serve
as negative evidence demonstrating the falsity of Pn.
The problem is how to define a truth value of the proposition Pn if neither evidence exists, that is,
if both sn and sm are false and no which-way detector is present.
To state this problem formally, let us use the double-bracket notation [[·] to express a truth value
of a mathematical statement or a proposition.
Due to its nature, a mathematical statement – atomic and molecular alike – cannot be both true
and false as well as neither true nor false. Hence, the relation between the set of mathematical
statements and the set of truth values is a total surjective-only function, i.e.,
v : S→ B2 , (16)
where S denotes the set of mathematical statements and B2 stands for the set of two truth values,
T (”true”) and F (”false”), which can be interpreted as integers 1 and 0, respectively. The image
of a mathematical statement, for example, s, under this function can be denoted by [[s] = v(s).
Let us introduce a total bijective (i.e., both injective and surjective) function b that takes truth
values of two (different) mathematical statements to elements of B2:
b : B2 × B2 → B2 . (17)
Using this function, the truth value of the proposition Pn can be considered as the image of ordered
pair ([[sn] , [[sm]) under b, that is,
[[Pn] = b ([[sn] , [[sm]) . (18)
Explicitly, the function b will return 1 if sn is true, and b will return 0 if sm is true; in symbols,
b(1, 0) = 1 and b(0, 1) = 0.
Then again, both sn and sm can be false, so, there is one more pair, (0, 0). Given three different
objects – i.e., three ordered pairs (1, 0), (0, 1) and (0, 0) – but only two elements of B2 to map them
onto, one has a problem (which can be called the problem of an extra object): What is the image
of the pair (0, 0) under the function b? In other words, what truth value does the proposition Pn
have if Ψ(x) is a superposition of the states φ1(x) and φ2(x)? Symbolically, this problem can be
presented as follows:
[[Pn] = b ([[sn] , [[sm]) =


1 , [[sn] = 1
0 , [[sm] = 1
? , [[sn] = [[sm] = 0
. (19)
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3 Truth values of a propositional formula
The problem of an extra object also concerns an assignment of the truth values to a propositional
formula (i.e., an expression involving finitely many logical connectives and propositions).
To ascertain this, let us turn to projection operators, i.e., self-adjoint operators with spectrum
contained in the two-element set {0, 1}. Such operators are in one-to-one correspondence with the
closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space H (i.e., a complex vector space upon which an inner or
scalar product is defined) [6].
Let Pˆ be a projection operator; then, every unit vector |Ψ〉 ∈ H can be decomposed uniquely
as |Ψ〉 = |ψ〉 + |φ〉 with |ψ〉 = Pˆ |Ψ〉 and |φ〉 = ¬Pˆ |Ψ〉, where ¬Pˆ is the projection operator
corresponding to the negation of Pˆ which can be expressed through the identical operator 1ˆ and Pˆ
as ¬Pˆ = 1ˆ− Pˆ , |ψ〉 belongs to the closed linear subspace H
Pˆ
, while |φ〉 lies in H⊥
Pˆ
, i.e., the closed
linear subspace orthogonal to H
Pˆ
. Therefore, Pˆ breaks the Hilbert space H into two orthogonal
subspaces,
H = H
Pˆ
⊕H⊥
Pˆ
, (20)
such that Pˆ leaves any vector in H
Pˆ
invariant but annihilates any vector in H⊥
Pˆ
, namely,
H
Pˆ
=
{
|ψ〉 ∈ H: Pˆ |ψ〉 = |ψ〉
}
, (21)
H⊥
Pˆ
=
{
|φ〉 ∈ H: Pˆ |φ〉 = 0
}
. (22)
For the Hermitian operator A with a discrete orthonormal basis in each eigenspace (i.e., a subspace
containing eigenvectors |an〉 of a given eigenvalue an), the projection operator Pˆ can be presented
as
Pˆn = |an〉〈an| , (23)
on condition that the eigenvalue an is nondegenerate (that is, the eigenspace is 1-dimensional).
Accordingly, two projection operators Pˆn and Pˆm of the same Hermitian operator A satisfy
PˆnPˆm = PˆmPˆn = δnmPˆn . (24)
In the case of the position operator X (whose spectrum is continuous), the projection operators Pˆ1
and Pˆ2 are associated with the intervals I1 and I2:
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In = [xn −∆x, xn +∆x] , (25)
where x1 = 0, x2 = d and ∆x is some positive value. Correspondingly, Pˆn can be presented as
Pˆn =
∫ xn+∆x
xn−∆x
|x〉〈x|dx , (26)
so that Pˆ1 and Pˆ2 are orthogonal if I1 and I2 do not intersect (i.e., if 2∆x < d).
Let L(H) denote the set of the closed linear subspaces of the Hilbert space H. As stated by [7], the
pair of elements in L(H) that represent the distinct propositions Q and P are the subspaces H
Qˆ
andH
Pˆ
, respectively. These subspaces can be called related or comparable in case the mathematical
statement z = z1 ⊔ z2 is true, that is, if the following holds
[[z] = max {[[z1] , [[z2]} = 1 , (27)
where z1 and z2 stand in for the mathematical statements that affirm the subset relation ⊆ among
H
Qˆ
and H
Pˆ
. Explicitly,
«H
Qˆ
⊆ H
Pˆ
»= z1 , (28)
«H
Pˆ
⊆ H
Qˆ
»= z2 . (29)
Note that when z is true, the projection operators Qˆ and Pˆ commute (are compatible), explicitly,
QˆPˆ = Pˆ Qˆ.
Contrastively, the subspaces H
Qˆ
and H
Pˆ
can be called orthogonal if the mathematical statement
w = w1 ⊔ w2 is true, i.e., if
[[w] = max {[[w1] , [[w2]} = 1 , (30)
where w1 and w2 substitute for the mathematical statements asserting the orthogonality relation
among H
Qˆ
and H
Pˆ
:
«H
Qˆ
⊆ H⊥
Pˆ
»= w1 , (31)
«H
Pˆ
⊆ H⊥
Qˆ
»= w2 . (32)
Note that in case w is true, the projection operators Qˆ and Pˆ are compatible and orthogonal, i.e.,
QˆPˆ = Pˆ Qˆ = 0.
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Clearly, if the subspaces H
Qˆ
and H
Pˆ
are orthogonal, they are incomparable, and if they are
comparable, they are not orthogonal. To be exact, except for the subspaces H0ˆ = {0} and H1ˆ = H,
the statements w and z cannot be true together:
(z ⊓ w)⇔ ⊥ . (33)
Even so, z and w may be false together:
(z ⊔ w)< ⊤ . (34)
In particular, if the projection operators Qˆ and Pˆ are not compatible, i.e., QˆPˆ 6= Pˆ Qˆ, then
H
Qˆ
* H
Pˆ
and H
Pˆ
* H
Qˆ
, as well as H
Qˆ
* H⊥
Pˆ
and H
Pˆ
* H⊥
Qˆ
.
Let the inequality Q≤P be expressible as Q⊓P ⇔Q or as Q⊔P⇔P . Also, let the inequality
Q≥P be expressible as Q⊓P⇔P or as Q⊔P⇔Q. Then, one can construct the propositional
formula Q⋚P meaning
Q⋚P ⇔ (Q≤P ) ⊔ (Q≥P ) . (35)
It can be phrased «Two distinct propositions, Q and P , about one and the same quantum system
can be true together». Given that for the above formula the equivalences [[z] = 1 and [[w] = 1 act
respectively as positive and negative evidences, its truth value can be considered as the image of
the ordered pair ([[z] , [[w]) under the map (17), i.e.,
[[Q⋚P ] = b ([[z] , [[w]) . (36)
Specifically, Q and P can be true together if H
Qˆ
and H
Pˆ
are comparable and, hence, not orthog-
onal; on the contrary, Q and P cannot be true together if H
Qˆ
and H
Pˆ
are orthogonal, therefore,
incomparable. That is, [[Q⋚P ] is equal to 1 on the pair (1, 0) and is equal to 0 on the pair (0, 1).
Again, similar to the situation with the atomic proposition Pn, the third pair exists, (0, 0), which
gives rise to the problem of an extra object. The problem is this: How should a truth value of
Q⋚P be defined in case that neither evidence exists for this propositional formula, that is, if the
subspaces H
Qˆ
and H
Pˆ
representing Q and P are neither comparable nor orthogonal? Symbolically,
[[Q⋚P ] = b ([[z] , [[w]) =


1 , [[z] = 1
0 , [[w] = 1
? , [[z] = [[w] = 0
. (37)
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4 Three-valued semantics
An apparently justified solution to the problem of an extra object is to abandon the principle,
according to which the set of the truth values must be limited to only two elements. Particularly,
one can suggest adding a third element to the set {T,F}, for example, the value U (“undefined” or
“indeterminate”), interpreted as a real number lying between 0 and 1, say, 1/2. The nature of the
added element is supposed to be the same as the one of the truth values T and F (otherwise, it
would be hard to guarantee the consistency and unambiguity of what exactly constitutes and what
does not constitute a set of the truth values).
As a result, the simple resolution of the extra object problem immediately follows. Indeed, using
the total bijective function
b : B2 × B2 → B3 (38)
whose codomain B3 is the collection of three elements, {T,U,F} or {1, 1/2, 0}, a truth value of the
proposition Pn can be defined by
[[Pn] = b ([[sn] , [[sm]) =


1 , [[sn] = 1
0 , [[sm] = 1
1/2 , [[sn] = [[sm] = 0
. (39)
Attractive as this proposal (initially introduced by Reichenbach [8]) might seem, it is open to seri-
ous objection.
First, why are there two different sets of the truth values – that is, the set {T,F} for statements
of mathematical relations (i.e., analytic statements) and the set {T,U,F} for propositions (i.e.,
synthetic statements)? Since the existence of a precisely cut distinction between analytic and syn-
thetic statements is doubtful [9], the presence of two sets of the truth values appears unlikely.
Second, if the intermediate truth value U is assigned to at least some proposition(s) in a proposi-
tional formula, how is one to determine a truth value thereof? It is known to be a major problem for
any multi-valued semantics since the act of ascertaining such a value is arbitrary by its very nature
[10]. For example, let us take the truth function of conjunction, ⊓, and suppose that its operands
have the truth values U and F. Then, according to Kleene’s “(strong) logic of indeterminacy” [11],
the said function must return F. However, in accordance with Bochvar’s “internal” three-valued
logic [12], the same function must produce U.
Third, let’s assume that if both slits are open and so the truth value U is assigned to both P1 and
P2 in accordance with (39), the propositional formulas P1⊔P2 and P1⊓P2 have equal truth values,
namely, U. Now, suppose that at some time, a which-way detector is placed at the double-slit plate.
After that, P1⊔P2 and P1⊓P2 transform respectively into a tautology and a contradiction. Hence,
unlike the endpoint truth values T and F, the intermediate truth value U gets destroyed as soon
as the observation is made. Recalling that U belongs to the same class of the objects as the truth
values T and F do, and so it must survive the observation like T and F do, one comes to absurdity.
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To avoid the above arguments, the problem of an extra object must be solved using a semantics in
which propositions may only have two possible truth values, T and F.
Such solutions will be examined in the next sections of the paper.
5 Birkhoff and von Neumann’s proposal
A solution proposed by Birkhoff and von Neumann [13, 14] is to assume that the function (17) is a
total surjective but not injective function. This function is not injective because it associates two
elements of B2 × B2 with one and the same element of B2. As a result, the image of the pair (0, 0)
under b may be equal to either 1 together with the pair (1, 0), or 0 together with the pair (0, 1). In
either case,
b(0, 0) ∈ B2 . (40)
On the other hand, using truth tables it is straightforward to demonstrate that for any two mathe-
matical statements, say, r1 and r2, such that (r1⊓ r2)⇔⊥ and (r1⊔ r2)<⊤, the logical biconditional
holds:
rn ⊔ (¬r1 ⊓ ¬r2)⇔ ¬rm . (41)
Hence, the application of the proposal (40) to (19) makes a truth value of the atomic proposition
Pn subject to a truth value of either the statement sn or the statement sm alone, but not both.
Concretely, in case b(0, 0) = 1, a truth value of Pn is determined by
[[Pn] = 1− [[sm] . (42)
In contrast, if b(0, 0) = 0, then the assignment of a truth value to Pn is given by
[[Pn] = [[sn] . (43)
In both cases, if either s1 or s2 is true, then [[Pn] = 1 while [[Pm] = 0. Providing truth values of the
propositional formulas P1⊓P2 and P1⊔P2 are determined by truth values of its components, namely,
[[P1 ⊓ P2] = min {[[P1] , [[P2]} , (44)
[[P1 ⊔ P2] = max {[[P1] , [[P2]} , (45)
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one finds that [[P1 ⊓ P2] = 0 but [[P1 ⊔ P2] = 1. That is, if either evidence for Pn is present (e.g.,
either slit is open, or a which-way detector reports the quantum particle at either slit), the exclusive
disjunction P1⊔P2, which is expressed in terms of the logical conjunction, disjunction and negation
as
P1⊔P2 ⇔ (P1 ⊔ P2) ⊓ ¬ (P1 ⊓ P2) (46)
and worded «In the double-slit experiment, the quantum particle passes through one or the other
slit, but not both», is a tautology (an attentive reader might remember that P1⊔P2 was labeled
C in Introduction; it was done there solely for the sake of simplicity). The truthfulness of the
exclusive disjunction P1⊔P2 suggests that the quantum particle behaves as a classically defined
particle.
Now, consider the case where both s1 and s2 are false (that is, the case where state of the quantum
particle at the instant it passes the double-slit plate is described by a superposition). Assume that
b(0, 0) = 0. This assumption brings on the equivalence [[P1] = [[P2] = 0, which means that before
being recorded on the screen the quantum particle went through neither slit. This does not seem
to make much physical sense. Hence, so long as b is a total non-injective surjective function, the
image of the pair (0, 0) under this function should be 1. In symbols,
b : B2 × B2 → B2
(0, 0) 7→ 1 , (47)
where the second part is read: “(0, 0) maps onto 1”.
Applying the above to (37) results in the following assignment:
[[Q⋚P ] = 1− [[w] . (48)
Since the mathematical statement w is either true or false, any two distinct propositions about the
same quantum system are either able or unable to be true together. This fact implies that every
pair of elements in L(H) is either ordered or not ordered by the subset relation ⊆. In this way,
L(H) proves to be a set with a partial order (a poset).
Being elements of the poset, any two subspaces in L(H), sayH
Qˆ
andH
Pˆ
, may have a meet (denoted
H
Qˆ
∧ H
Pˆ
) and a join (denoted H
Qˆ
∨ H
Pˆ
), regardless of compatibility between the projection
operators Qˆ and Pˆ that correspond to those subspaces. Particularly, since for any set of subsets,
the set-intersection ∩ interprets meet ∧, the meet operation on elements of the poset L(H) can be
defined as follows
H
Qˆ
∧H
Pˆ
= H
Qˆ
∩H
Pˆ
. (49)
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Furthermore, because the subspace H¬Qˆ is the set of all vectors of H that are not in HQˆ, except
the zero subspace, {0}, namely,
H¬Qˆ =
{
|ψ〉 ∈ H:
(
1ˆ− Qˆ
)
|ψ〉 = |ψ〉
}
, (50)
it holds H¬Qˆ = H⊥Qˆ. Similarly, H¬Pˆ = H⊥Pˆ . Thus, the join HQˆ ∨HPˆ can be derived from the meet
operation using De Morgan’s law [15], i.e.,
H
Qˆ
∨H
Pˆ
=
(
H¬Qˆ ∩H¬Pˆ
)⊥
. (51)
In this manner, the poset L(H) can be held as a complete lattice (usually called a Hilbert lattice).
Provided that Q⊓P and Q⊔P are represented by the meet and join of the subspaces H
Qˆ
and H
Pˆ
,
truth values of these propositional formulas are supposed to be assigned in the way similar to the
valuation (42). Specifically,
[[Q ⊓ P ] = 1− [[s∧⊥ ] , (52)
[[Q ⊔ P ] = 1− [[s∨⊥ ] , (53)
where s∧⊥ and s∨⊥ are intended to represent the mathematical statements
«|Ψ〉 ∈
(
H
Qˆ
∧H
Pˆ
)⊥
»= s∧⊥ , (54)
«|Ψ〉 ∈
(
H
Qˆ
∨H
Pˆ
)⊥
»= s∨⊥ , (55)
in which |Ψ〉 is the vector of H describing the state of the quantum system in the double-slit
experiment:
|Ψ〉 =
∫
Ψ(x)|x〉dx . (56)
If Ψ(x) is a superposition, then [[P1] = [[P2] = 1 in accordance with (42). Recalling that the propo-
sitional formulas P1 ⊓ P2 and P1 ⊔ P2 are truth-functional, this entails [[P1 ⊓ P2] = [[P1 ⊔ P2] = 1.
That is, if two slits are open (and no which-way detector is present), the exclusive disjunction
P1⊔P2 is a contradiction.
However, this may not suggest that the quantum particle is wave-like. The falsity of P1⊔P2 can
be explained away by non-distributivity of the logical operators ⊓ and ⊔ over each other caused
by nondistributiveness of the lattice L(H). To demonstrate this, take the vector |Ψ〉 in the form of
the sum
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|Ψ〉 = c1|φ1〉+ c2|φ2〉 , (57)
in which the constituent quantum states |φn〉 are given in (10). Also, suppose that the vector |Ψ〉
belongs to the linear subspace H
Qˆ
that is in one-one correspondence with the projection operator
Qˆ representing the proposition Q, while the vectors |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 are respectively in the subspaces
H
Pˆ1
and H
Pˆ2
corresponding to the orthogonal projection operators Pˆ1 and Pˆ2 shown in (26).
Consider the propositional formula ¬Q⊔ (P1 ⊓P2), where ¬Q is the negation of Q. Because ¬Q is
false in the state |Ψ〉∈H
Qˆ
, the truth value of the said formula therein can be defined as
[[¬Q ⊔ (P1 ⊓ P2)] = max
{
[[¬Q] , [[P1 ⊓ P2]
}
= [[P1 ⊓ P2] . (58)
SinceH
Pˆ1
∧H
Pˆ2
is the zero subspace, {0}, orthogonal to the identical subspace, H, the mathematical
statement «|Ψ〉 ∈ (H
Pˆ1
∧H
Pˆ2
)⊥» is true for any vector |Ψ〉 in H. Denoting this statement s ′
∧⊥ , one
consequently gets
[[P1 ⊓ P2] = 1− [[s ′∧⊥ ] = 0 . (59)
Now, take the propositional formula (¬Q⊔P1)⊓ (¬Q⊔P2). In the state |Ψ〉 ∈HQˆ, the truth value
of this formula is defined by
[[(¬Q ⊔ P1) ⊓ (¬Q ⊔ P2)] = min
{
[[¬Q ⊔ P1] , [[¬Q ⊔ P2]
}
= min
{
[[P1] , [[P2]
}
. (60)
On the other hand, considering that the subspace H
Qˆ
intersects (meets) the subspace H
Pˆm
at {0},
namely,
H
Qˆ
∩H
Pˆm
=
{
|ψ〉∈H: Qˆ|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 and Pˆm|ψ〉 = |ψ〉
}
= {0} , (61)
the statement «|Ψ〉 ∈ (H¬Qˆ∨HPˆn)⊥» = s ′∨⊥ is false for any nonzero vector |Ψ〉 in the Hilbert space:
s ′∨⊥ ⇔ «|Ψ〉 ∈ {0}». Thus,
[[¬Q ⊔ Pn] = 1− [[s ′∨⊥ ] = 1 , (62)
and so, the valuation (60) returns min{[P1] , [[P2]} = 1 meaning [[P1 ⊓ P2] = 1. It follows then that
nondistributiveness of the lattice L(H), namely,
H¬Qˆ ∨
(H
Pˆ1
∧H
Pˆ2
) 6= ∧
n∈{1,2}
(
H¬Qˆ ∨HPˆn
)
, (63)
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is responsible for duality in the truth assignment for the propositional formula P1 ⊓ P2.
One can assume from the above that even if both slits are open (and no which-way detector is
placed behind them), the quantum particle will pass through just one slit, and so the exclusive
disjunction P1 ⊔ P2 will always be true. As to the valuation [[P1 ⊓P2] = 1, one can blame it on the
use of the distributivity law that does not hold generally in the Hilbert lattice.
From this assumption the ensuing hypothesis can be construed: A non-distributive logic (i.e., one
where the statement ¬Q⊔ (P1 ⊓ P2)⇔ (¬Q ⊔ P1)⊓ (¬Q ⊔ P2) does not need to be valid) underlies
quantum phenomena and, for this reason, should be regarded as the correct logic for reasoning
about the microscopic world. In such a view, classical logic is merely a limiting case of a non-
distributive logic [16]. It is obvious that the minute the said hypothesis is accepted, the conundrum
of wave–particle duality will cease to exist.
However, the aforesaid hypothesis gives rise to another problem, which can be posed as the follow-
ing question: Given that the true logic is non-distributive, how may it be the case that the logical
connectives ⊓ and ⊔ still distribute one over the other in some occasions?
The essence of this problem (discussed briefly in [17]) is that it is impossible to determine in what
circumstances the connectives ⊓ and ⊔ will distribute based solely on a propositional formula. In
order to do so, the meaning of propositions involved in the formula, specifically, the fact that the
propositions have a classical content, must be taken into consideration. However, the content of
the propositions is first to throw away in such formulas.
6 The proposal of a partial bivaluation
The alternative proposal allowing to overcome the problem of an extra object is to assume that
the function (17) is a partial bijective function that associates elements of B2 with some elements
of B2 × B2. Specifically, this function denotes the following:
b : B2 × B2 ✄→ B2
(0, 0) ✄7→ τ ∈ B2
, (64)
where the first part can be read as: “b is a partial function from B2×B2 to B2”, while the second
part is read: “(0, 0) does not map onto anything in B2”. That is, b is only defined on the pairs (1, 0)
and (0, 1) whereas b(0, 0) stays undefined.
The application of this proposal (which can be called the proposal of a partial bivaluation) to (19)
yields the following truth assignment
[[Pn] = b ([[sn] , [[sm]) =


1 , [[sn] = 1
0 , [[sm] = 1
undefined , [[sn] = [[sm] = 0
. (65)
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As this assignment indicates, the absence of proof that the proposition Pn is false does not guarantee
that this proposition is true; even more so, when neither evidence is provided, the proposition Pn
has no truth value at all. Hence, the above assignment may be viewed as one done constructively,
i.e., using a semantics which only admits constructive proofs.
It is worthy of notice that a truth-value gap – i.e., lack a truth value – does not stand for an
intermediate truth value, akin to the value U (“undefined”) in a three-valued semantics.
To see this, let us interpret the truth-value gap as the indeterminate form 0
0
. In a loose manner of
speaking, 0
0
can take on the values 0, 1, or ∞. That is, the expression 0
0
does not provide sufficient
information to determine its value; in other words, it is undefined [18].
Hence, it is impossible to say whether the form 0
0
is greater than or equal to 0, or whether 0
0
is less
than or equal to 1. Likewise, it is impossible to say whether a truth-value gap is “truer” than or
identical to F or whether it is “falser” than or identical to T. This means that a truth-value gap
cannot be an intermediate truth value. Correspondingly, a semantics allowing a truth-value gap
has no interpretation as a three-valued semantics.
Pondering upon the relation between a truth-value gap and the epistemic predicates “verified”
and “falsified”, it is possible to state the following: Seeing that “verified” and “falsified” are not
identified with “true” and “false” (suffice it to say that a statement may be verified at one time
and not at another, however, it may be true even at times when it was not verified; likewise, it
may be false without being falsified [19]), a statement may be verified or falsified at a certain time
without being previously either true or false (as a result, from that time onward this statement
would be thought to be either a true one or a false one). For example, providing reproducibility
of the double-slit experiment, the proposition Pn, which has a truth-value gap when both slits are
open, can be verified in one instance and falsified in another by positioning a which-way detector at
the slits. With that, the occurrence of the proposition Pn being verified/falsified would be subject
to variations due to chance.
This gives a reason to assign a probability to one or the other of the epistemic predicates “verified”
and “falsified”. Suppose that at some time, a proposition is verified by an experience (e.g., an
observation or experiment). Understandably, such an outcome of the experience would be either
certain or impossible if the proposition where to have a definite truth value, that is, either “true”
or “false” respectively. On the other hand, where the proposition to have no truth value at all, the
outcome “verified” would be neither certain nor impossible. Accordingly, the probability of being
verified must be dispersion-free, i.e., either 1 or 0, for a proposition having a definite truth value
and different from both 1 and 0 for a proposition having a truth-value gap. The above can be
presented symbolically as follows
Pr[P is verified] =


1 , [[P ] = 1
0 , [[P ] = 0
x ∈ (0, 1) , [[P ] is undefined
, (66)
where Pr[P is verified] denotes the probability that a proposition P will be verified by the experi-
ence sometime.
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The application of the proposal (64) to (37) produces
[[Q⋚P ] = b ([[z] , [[w]) =


1 , [[z] = 1
0 , [[w] = 1
undefined , [[z] = [[w] = 0
. (67)
As it follows, if the mathematical statements z and w are false together, the proposition Q⋚P has
no truth value. That is, in case the projection operators Qˆ and Pˆ do not commute, the propositions
Q and P are neither able nor unable to be true together. Consequently, one has no permission to
say that the subspaces H
Qˆ
and H
Pˆ
representing Q and P are either ordered or not ordered by the
subset relation ⊆. Otherwise stated, one may not say that L(H) is a poset.
Nevertheless, consider a Boolean block, that is, a subset of L(H), in which any two elements, say,
the subspaces H
Qˆ
and H
Pˆ
, correspond to mutually compatible projection operators, Qˆ and Pˆ ,
respectively. Inside this block, either [[z] or [[w] is equal to 1; thus, the proposition Q⋚P is either
true or false. From this it is possible to deduce that each Boolean block is a partially ordered subset
of L(H). So, the meet H
Qˆ
∧H
Pˆ
and the join H
Qˆ
∨H
Pˆ
can be defined within every Boolean block.
E.g.,
QˆPˆ = Pˆ Qˆ :
H
Qˆ
∧H
Pˆ
= H
Qˆ
∩H
Pˆ
H
Qˆ
∨H
Pˆ
=
(
H¬Qˆ ∩H¬Pˆ
)⊥ . (68)
Outside Boolean blocks, i.e., in case QˆPˆ 6= Pˆ Qˆ, the above operations are not defined. One can
infer from this fact that propositional formulas constructed from propositions associated with non-
compatible projection operators are not defined either.
If the proposition Q⋚P has a truth value (i.e., if it happens inside a Boolean block), the mathe-
matical statements
«|Ψ〉 ∈
(
H
Qˆ
∧H
Pˆ
)
» = s∧
«|Ψ〉 ∈
(
H
Qˆ
∧H
Pˆ
)⊥
»= s∧⊥
, (69)
which serve as positive and negative evidences, respectively, for the propositional formula Q ⊓ P ,
cannot be true together. Explicitly, for any nonzero vector |Ψ〉 of a Hilbert space H, one finds that
(s∧ ⊓ s∧⊥)⇔ ⊥. Similarly, the statements
«|Ψ〉 ∈
(
H
Qˆ
∨H
Pˆ
)
» = s∨
«|Ψ〉 ∈
(
H
Qˆ
∨H
Pˆ
)⊥
»= s∨⊥
, (70)
which are positive and negative evidences, in that order, for the propositional formula Q ⊔ P , do
not admit each other, i.e., (s∨⊓s∨⊥)⇔ ⊥, if |Ψ〉 ∈H and |Ψ〉 6= 0. Hence, in line with the proposal
(64), Q ⊓ P and Q ⊔ P may be valuated using only positive evidences, namely,
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QˆPˆ = Pˆ Qˆ :
[[Q ⊓ P ] = [[s∧]
[[Q ⊔ P ] = [[s∨]
. (71)
Recall that as per the formula (26), the projection operators Pˆ1 and Pˆ2 representing the atomic
propositions P1 and P2 in the double-slit experiment are compatible and orthogonal. So, the meet
and join of the subspaces H
Pˆ1
and H
Pˆ2
corresponding to Pˆ1 and Pˆ2 are
Pˆ1Pˆ2 = Pˆ2Pˆ1 = 0 :
H
Pˆ1
∧H
Pˆ2
= {0}
H
Pˆ1
∨H
Pˆ2
=
(
H
Pˆ2
∧H
Pˆ1
)⊥
= H
. (72)
From the above, the statements «|Ψ〉∈(H
Pˆ1
∧H
Pˆ2
)» = s′∧ and «|Ψ〉∈(HPˆ1∨HPˆ2)» = s′∨ are false
and true, respectively, for any non-zero vector |Ψ〉 in the Hilbert space H. Hence, at one with (71),
the following must hold
∀|Ψ〉 ∈ H\{0} :
[[P1 ⊓ P2] = [[s′∧] = 0
[[P1 ⊔ P2] = [[s′∨] = 1
. (73)
The projection operator 0ˆ, which is in the one-to-one correspondence with the subspace H
Pˆ1
∧H
Pˆ2
representing P1 ⊓ P2, is compatible with any projection operator; thus, the propositional formula
¬Q ⊔ (P1 ⊓ P2) is defined and has the same truth value as the negation ¬Q does. To be sure,
(1ˆ− Qˆ)0ˆ = 0ˆ(1ˆ− Qˆ) : [[¬Q ⊔ (P1 ⊓ P2)] =


1 , [[s¬Q] = 1
0 , [[sQ] = 1
, (74)
where s¬Q and sQ respectively denote the statements «|Ψ〉∈H¬Qˆ» and «|Ψ〉∈HQˆ».
By contrast, the projection operator Qˆ corresponding to the subspace H
Qˆ
(containing the vector
|Ψ〉 = c1|φ1〉 + c2|φ2〉 in which |φ1〉 ∈ HPˆ1 and |φ2〉 ∈ HPˆ2) is compatible with neither Pˆ1 nor Pˆ2.
The same holds for ¬Qˆ and Pˆn: (1ˆ − Qˆ)Pˆn 6= Pˆn(1ˆ − Qˆ). Given that the subspaces H¬Qˆ and
H
Pˆn
cannot be in one Boolean block, the operation H¬Qˆ ∧ HPˆn is not defined and therefrom the
propositional formula (¬Q ⊔ P1) ⊓ (¬Q ⊔ P2) is not defined as well.
Note the difference between the statement asserting that two propositional formulas, namely,
¬Q⊔ (P1 ⊓ P2) and (¬Q ⊔ P1) ⊓ (¬Q ⊔ P2), have unequal truth values and the statement declar-
ing that the first of these formulas is defined at the same time as the second is not. The former
statement entails the inequality ¬Q⊔ (P1 ⊓ P2)< (¬Q ⊔ P1)⊓ (¬Q ⊔ P2), whereas the latter does
not. The said difference means that unlike the proposal suggested by Birkhoff and von Neumann,
one that assumes a partial bivaluation does not entail the failure of distributivity.
Let either of slits be open (or let a which-way detector register the particle at one or the other slit).
Then, in accordance with (65), one of the propositions Pn is true while the other is false. Together
with that, the exclusive disjunction P1⊔P2 is a tautology:
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∀|Ψ〉 ∈ H\{0} : [[P1⊔P2] = min
{
[[«|Ψ〉∈H»] , 1− [[«|Ψ〉∈{0}»]} = 1 . (75)
This implies that in the given case the logical connectives ⊓ and ⊔ are truth-functional.
Now, suppose that both slits are open, and no which-way detector is placed at the double-slit
plate. In that case, the logical connectives ⊓ and ⊔ cannot be said to be truth-functional for even
though [[P1] and [[P2] are undefined, the propositional formulas P1 ⊔ P2 and P1 ⊓ P2 are true and
false anyway. As a result, even as both P1 and P2 have no truth value, the exclusive disjunction
P1⊔P2 is necessary true. This is to say, it is such that no instance exists in which this propositional
formula could fail to be true.
Hence, the proposal based on the assumption of a partial bivaluation does not bring about the
wave-particle duality. As stated by this proposal, the quantum particle can always be described as
a particle-like thing, regardless of determination of a measuring device in the double-slit experiment.
7 Concluding remarks
Birkhoff and von Neumann’s proposal assumes that without negative evidence – i.e., when the
mathematical statement sm is false – the proposition Pn should be accepted as a true one. In
other words, according to this proposal, the absence of a demonstration that a proposition is false
guarantees that the proposition is true. Clearly, such an assumption would be correct if every
proposition were to have a definite truth value regardless of proof.
On the other hand, in a semantics validating classical logic, every proposition is conceived as pos-
sessing a determinate truth value independently of whether we know it or have at our disposal the
means to prove it [20]. One can conclude from this that a semantics validating Birkhoff and von
Neumann’s proposal is like a semantics that bears out classical logic.
But here lies the irony: Birkhoff and von Neumann’s proposal, which was intended to be a replace-
ment for classical logic in the domain of quantum mechanics, has at its core a semantics of classical
logic that underlies the principles of classical mechanics. This may explain why Birkhoff and von
Neumann’s proposal for quantum logic has not made a great deal of progress in a solution of the
quantum conceptual difficulties.
Contrastively, a semantics validating the proposal of a partial bivaluation differs from any seman-
tics that classical logic might have (at least in some crucial respect). Namely, in the said semantics
(called supervaluationism), a propositional formula can possess a definite truth value even if its
constituent propositions do not [21, 22, 23]. Hence, supervaluation semantics may offer a different
approach to the quantum conceptual problems.
For example, according to the textbook interpretation of quantum mechanics [24], our choice of
what to observe in the double-slit experiment determines the properties of a quantum particle
therein. Accordingly, the quantum particle stops behaving like a wave and becomes a particle-like
entity when an observation of a particle’s path takes place.
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But according to the proposal of a partial bivaluation, the quantum particle’s properties are not
contingent upon observation. To be exact, in the double-slit experiment, the quantum particle al-
ways behaves like a particle-like entity – i.e., one that goes along one path or the other but not both
– irrespective of the observation. Together with all that, a statement affirming that the quantum
particle follows a certain path has no truth value at all. One can only consider the probability that
this statement will be verified if the actual particle’s path is observed. Because of that, to convey in
classical concepts (i.e., ones that are based on classical logic) the behavior of the quantum particle
in the double-slit experiment comes about impossible.
In addition, the application of the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics to any sentient
creature leads to a paradox known as Schrödinger’s cat. The paradox involves a cat which – in
agreement with the aforesaid interpretation – may be simultaneously both dead and alive. It could
remain in such an inconceivable and absurd state for an arbitrarily long period of time, until the
observer opens an opaque box enclosing the cat, at which point the animal is either dead or alive.
By contrast, according to the proposal of a partial bivaluation, the cat (together with a decaying
radioactive atom on which its fate depends) is in either one state or another but never both, regard-
less of a “conscious” or “unconscious” observation. That is, for the cat, the premise of “macroscopic
realism” [25] (declaring that a macroscopic system is in one or other of two macroscopically distinct
states available to it but not in both) is always true. Therewithal, the proposition asserting that
the cat is in a certain state (e.g., dead) prior to the observation has absolutely no truth value
(because neither evidence exists for this proposition before the observation). Still, this proposition
may be verified/falsified (with some probability) by opening the box.
Similarly, Wigner’s conundrum of the friend presents no paradox for the proposal of a partial bi-
valuation. To be sure, let us consider a slightly modified account of Wigner’s thought experiment
[26]. It posits an inside observer, a friend of Wigner, who has been asked to perform the double-slit
experiment in a completely closed laboratory (so that an outside observer, Wigner, cannot be aware
of anything happening in it until its door is open). Suppose that at some time the inside observer
introduces a which-way detector at the double-slit plate. Thenceforth, for this observer the ex-
clusive disjunction P1⊔P2 is a tautology. However, for the period that the door of the laboratory
keeps on being closed, P1⊔P2 will continue to be a contradiction for the outside observer.
Hence, a straightforward application of the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics to
Wigner’s thought experiment appears to show that the assignment of truth values to P1⊔P2 is
paradoxical: At one and the same time, P1⊔P2 is true for one observer and false for the other.
Wigner’s puzzle takes us back to the central question of the present paper: Are the truth values
absolute or relative?
According to both quantum Bayesianism (abbreviated QBism) [27] and the relational quantum
mechanics (abbreviated RQM) [28, 29], the paradoxality of the truth assignment for P1⊔P2 disap-
pears once “true” and “false” are identified with the “experiences” of different observers. In both
QBism and RQM, “true” and “false” are not objective, rather “facts relative to the observers” –
in other words, they are observers’ personal judgements [30]. In a slogan: ‘One’s “true” might be
someone else’s “false”’.
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This by no means indicates that QBism and RQM are self-contradictory: The moment the door of
the laboratory is open, Wigner and the friend (along with the whole laboratory) will combine into
one system, and so Wigner‘s “false” will be converted into friend’s “true”. Consequently, Wigner
and his friend will never find a disagreement between their truth assignments.
Be that as it may, accepting the dependency of the truth values upon an agent (an entity similar to
a team of scientists sharing notebooks, calculations, observations, etc., who can take actions freely
on parts of the world external to themselves [31]) does not amount to giving up the existence of an
absolute “macroreality”, much less the absolute nature of facts. Permitting the relativity of “true”
and “false” has the value of forsaking the objectivity of mathematics. In a bit more detail, if “true”
and “false” are subject to agent’s judgements, then the truth of every mathematical statement must
be an agent’s belief, “supremely strong, but nonetheless a belief”.
The question regarding the objectivity of mathematics, such as whether mathematical truth is
objective or subjective, is perhaps one of the oldest and hardest questions in Western philosophy.
On the one hand, seeing as mathematics is a free activity of the mind, one may consider mathemat-
ical truth subjective. In agreement with Putnam [19], if the only method allowed in mathematics
had consisted in deriving conclusions from axioms, which have been fixed permanently and for all
possible agents (using mathematics), then the truth of any mathematical statement would have
been objective, i.e., independent of agents’ personal judgements. But it did not. To prove a math-
ematical statement an agent may use empirical and probabilistic arguments seemed plausible for
this agent but not acceptable for the other. As a result, the mathematical statement in question
would be true for the former and false for the latter. For example, until a well-defined meaning
was given to the Dirac delta function, δ(x), the computations made using this function appeared
to most mathematicians as nonsense [32]. Consequently, even though a mathematical statement
involving this function such as «(xδ(x) = 0)⊓ (∫ +∞−∞ δ(x)dx = 1)» might be considered true by some
mathematicians, it would be regarded as false by the rest.
But on the other hand, if a mathematical statement is true because it has a constructive proof,
such a statement will be true absolutely. Indeed, in that case there is a constructive witness to
the truthfulness of the statement, that is, an actual example proving it true. And because this
example exists in fact and not merely potential or possible, it is the fact for all agents. Hence, the
said mathematical statement will be true for every agent, that is, true absolutely.
From the above reasoning it follows that by accepting the relativity of the truth values, QBism and
RQM merely reject constructivist philosophy.
That is quite different from the proposal of a partial bivaluation. To be sure, let us consider the
mathematical statement «∀|Ψ〉 ∈H\{0}». Any physically meaningful state, i.e., every state describ-
able by non-zero vector |Ψ〉 of a finite-dimensional Hilbert space H, is computable. Therefore, as
far as a physical meaning is concerned, there exists computational evidence witnessing the truth of
the statement «∀|Ψ〉 ∈H\{0}». What is more, because computability of |Ψ〉 means a constructive
mechanism generating |Ψ〉, one may say that the statement «∀|Ψ〉 ∈H\{0}» is constructively true.
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This entails the absolute truth of the exclusive disjunction P1⊔P2 whose evidence, in accordance
with the proposal of a partial bivaluation, is provided by the truthfulness of the said statement –
see Eq. (75). Put differently, in view of the fact that «∀|Ψ〉 ∈ H\{0}» is constructively true, the
propositional formula P1⊔P2 was, is and will be true for any agent – Wigner and his friend alike
– without regard for the agent’s personal experience or belief.
Using the terminology of QBism and RQM, one can say that only the epistemic predicates “ver-
ified” and “falsified” are “facts for the agents”. Such predicates are relative given that they are
personal to the agents who perform experiments or observations.
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